# APPELLANT REQUESTS ORAL ARGUMENT

#### 2:20-cv-02149-AB

# IN APPEAL IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARY CUMMINS, Defendant and Appellant,

٧.

KONSTANTIN KHIONIDI, as Trustee of the COBBS TRUST Plaintiff and Appellee

Appeal from Order of US Bankruptcy Court Adverse Proceeding
Central District of California

Case Nos. 2:18-ap-01066-RK, 2:17-bk-24993-RK Honorable Robert Kwan

#### APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

Mary Cummins
Petitioner, Plaintiff, Appellant In Pro Per
645 W. 9th St. #110-140
Los Angeles, CA 90015-1640
(310) 877-4770 Direct
(310) 494-9395 Fax

mmmaryinla@aol.com mmmarycummins@gmail.com

### **IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL**

#### **APPELLANT:**

# **Mary Cummins**

In Pro Per 645 W. 9th St. #110-140 Los Angeles, CA 90015-1640 (310) 877-4770 Direct (310) 494-9395 Fax mmmaryinla@aol.com

### **APPELLEE:**

# Konstantin Khionidi, Trustee of the Cobbs Trust

Philip Stillman, Esq. SBN# 152861 Stillman & Associates 3015 North Bay Road, Suite B Miami Beach, Florida 33140 Tel. and Fax: (888) 235-4279

pstillman@stillmanassociates.com

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	nkruptcy Appellate Panel, of the Ninth 15530 B.R. 456 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2015)	

### REPLY TO APPELLEE'S INTRODUCTION

Appellant filed a valid appeal with merit of a non-fully litigated judgment from an absolutely frivolous defamation case in Texas.

Appellant never defamed Plaintiff with malice or otherwise. Plaintiff never even stated what they felt was defamatory in the trial case.

Because of frivolous defamation cases such as this case Texas passed the Citizen Participation Act and the Defamation Mitigation Act (cited in Opening Brief) after this case was filed. It's now mandatory for the Plaintiff to state and even prove what they feel is defamatory before they can file a defamation case.

Plaintiff did not state or prove one element of defamation in the trial case. Plaintiff did not even state who made any statements. The "trial" of the case was so unjust that Defendant might as well have not appeared in the case and lost by default. As it is there was no separate hearing, trial for damages in the case making the judgment not fully litigated which was argued in the Adversary Proceeding case.

In the trial court the Plaintiff was asked under oath on the stand if
Plaintiff had any proof that Defendant or Defendant's behavior caused
any damages, loss or any action to Plaintiff. Plaintiff stated "no." It's

therefore impossible for a monetary judgment to stand against the Plaintiff's own sworn statements.

The Judgment does not state the words "defamation," "defamatory," "libel" or "slander." The Judgment does not state "malice." Because the Plaintiff did not even state what they felt was defamatory or who made any of those statements, it's absolutely impossible to state Defendant defamed Plaintiff with malice. Defamation must be proven in order to show, prove malice. Malice is very difficult to prove in defamation cases.

Appellant contested the Facts and Findings in the Adversary

Proceeding case. It is absolutely impossible to state that the judgment is a "list of defamatory statements" when the judgment does not state that. The judgment is a take down order only. Appellant did not write or post all of the items in the judgment. Most were made by the Plaintiff, Government Agencies, other known and unknown people. As example the judgment states Defendant must remove a non-copyrighted manual written and publicly shared by Plaintiff. It's impossible for Plaintiff's unedited manual to be Defendant's defamation.

If Appellant did not properly cite the record in Appellant's Opening

Brief, Defendant will try to remedy this to the best of Appellant's ability.

Only one Reporter's transcript was used in the case. It is incorporated in the Court record as it was used in a legal filing in this case.

Appellant designated almost the entire Court record on Appeal and cited the same in the Opening Brief. Appellant did not know any part needed to be reproduced. Appellant will try to remedy this by hereby incorporating the record into this brief. Appellant did include an Appendix which Appellee was served upon filing of the Opening Brief.

Appellant did not "make up" any statements in Appellant's Opening Brief. All statements came directly from the court record. As Appellant stated to the Court in Motion for Extension Appellant's computer crashed. Appellant lost the original Opening Brief and most court records for the case. Appellant is indigent because of Appellee's behavior and cannot afford to buy the records. The record was not provided for free as in most appeals. Appellee has intentionally defamed, attacked Appellant in order to make it impossible for Appellant to be able to work to earn money. Appellee's behavior is the proximate cause and reason Appellant filed for bankruptcy and why Appellant cannot afford to buy the records. One would think a party who alleges "defamation" would not intentionally defame opposing party with malice in order to intentionally interfere with business

relations and the litigation of this case and judgment. This is more evidence of unclean hands.

# REPLY TO APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF THE CASE A. The Underlying Texas Case

### 1. Defamation Intention

Per law the only thing that matters is the final written signed judgment that is filed with the Court. From the time the trial ended and the Judge signed the final judgment the Judge reviewed evidence and the law and came to his final written judgment. Judgment from the bench is not binding.

# 2. Texas Appeals Court ruling

It is absolutely impossible for the Appeals Court to state that Defendant intended to cause harm with Defendant's words and actions. Defendant filed fair and privileged reports to government authorities about Plaintiff. Plaintiff's Texas lawyer stated in Court that Plaintiff admitted Defendant's reports were "fair and privileged reports to government agencies" and they "weren't asking for them to be removed" from the Internet.

Plaintiff never stated before or during the trial what Plaintiff felt was defamatory. It is therefore impossible to state that words

never mentioned were intentionally made by Defendant to cause harm to Plaintiff. Plaintiff never even stated who made any statements. The statements in the final order were not all made by Defendant. Most were made by Plaintiff, government agencies, Plaintiff's veterinarian and other known and unknown people.

The words of the Appeals Court don't matter in regard to the issues in the trial court judgment under consideration for this bankruptcy. If Defendant had never appealed, there would be no words from the Appeals Court. Only what is in the actual judgment matters. In this case the Appeals Court misquoted the record on the main issues many times and refused to rehear the case based on those facts.

### 3. Actual Malice

The original case was for breach of contract, liquidated damages, attorney fees, copyright, sharing of proprietary data and defamation. The judgment does not mention "defamation," "defamatory," "libel," "slander..." The judgment only mentions breach of contract, liquidated damages and attorney fees. The judgment does not specify which monetary award goes with

which claim. Because "defamation" is never mentioned one must assume the award is only for the mentioned claims. All other claims reversed on appeal.

In order for a judgment to be enforceable it must list the names of the parties, the date, the claims and the award. This judgment also states that anything not specifically written in the actual judgment is not included. "Defamation" is not in the judgment.

The judgment does not state "malice." While the word "exemplary" is included the judgment does not state "defamation." Therefore defamation could not be the exemplary claim. The only claims listed are breach of contract, liquidated damages and attorneys fees. All of those claims were reversed in the Appeals Court.

The judgment included prior restraint making the judgment void. The prior restraint was also reversed in the Appeals Court.

While Defendant could have posted those items after the Appeals Court ruling, Defendant has never done so.

### 4. "False statements" about Lollar

Defendant has never made false statements about Plaintiff
Lollar to this day. Plaintiff never stated any false statements that
Defendant made about Plaintiff in the trial court. It is therefore
impossible for the Appeals Court to then state Defendant made
false statements. Again, the only thing that matters is the trial
court judgment.

### B. The California Sister-state Judgment

Plaintiff Lollar filed the sister-state judgment in California. Plaintiff did not attach or file the Appeals Court ruling. The Appeals Court ruling has never been a part of the Judgment. The minutes of the trial have never been a part of the Judgment.

Plaintiff Lollar signed as assignment to Konstantin Khionidi.

Konstantin Khionidi does not exist. In order for a contract to be viable there must be two real parties, i.e. "Legally binding contracts are agreements made between two or more parties that are enforceable by law and are valid according to federal and state contract laws."

In this case there is only one party. Plaintiff's current attorney

Philip Stillman stated that Konstantin would sign and notarize an

agreement giving the Judgment back to Plaintiff Lollar. Konstantin

has never signed a notarized document because Konstantin does not exist.

# C. The Adversary Proceeding

The Adversary Proceeding was filed.

### **D. The Summary Judgment Motions**

Appellee filed their first Motion for Summary Judgment and was denied May 25, 2018 as it did not meet the "willful and malicious injury" standard of California. The order is attached to the Opening Brief.

Plaintiff filed a second Motion for Summary Judgment which was granted in part. Appellant appeals that ruling. The judgment does not meet the level of non-dischargeability in California. The judgment is dischargeable per 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). There was no "willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity."

In order for there to be "willful and malicious injury" Plaintiff would have to have shown this in the trial court. It would have to be contained in the actual judgment that is the subject of this bankruptcy. There is no "willful and malicious injury" in the judgment. One cannot add words to a judgment years after it was

rendered especially when the judgment itself states it does not include anything which is not written in the judgment.

If Appellant had never appealed, there would have been no Appeals Court judgment. If Appellant had never answered the complaint, there would have been an unlitigated default judgment.

In this case there was no separate hearing for damages which is mandatory. "The damage calculus must dovetail with the individual claims and provide a clear, common sense connection. The amounts must be both reasonable and based on findings in the record."

An approximate \$6,173,000 judgment is wholly absurd in this case. Plaintiff Lollar had no paying employment and didn't lose one penny. Plaintiff admitted there was no loss or proof of any loss or damages under oath in court. Appellee would have to show the "pertinent issue was litigated and decided, even if by default." The damages hearing was basically by default as there was no damages hearing or trial. Appellee did not prove that any damages match the "defamation" claim. Again, the judgment doesn't even state for which claims the damages were awarded. We don't know if they were the dismissed claims.

Plaintiff stated under oath on the record that Plaintiff had no evidence of any damages or causation by defendant. There can be no damage claim if there is no evidence. The judgment is therefore dischargeable.

### REPLY TO APPELLEE'S SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Appellant did not order the transcripts of the Motions for Summary

Judgment hearings. Appellant was never told this was necessary. If

Appellant had been told it was necessary, Appellant would not have
been able to afford to order the transcripts. Appellant is indigent.

Appellant did cite the full court record of documents filed in the opening brief.

Appellant did include one transcript of one hearing in the motions filed. That transcript proves that Appellee does not exist. That is one of the main issues which trumps most of the other issues besides dischargeability.

Appellant is a pro se party. The pro se clinic has been closed during the pandemic. Appellant is not an attorney. Appellant is filing these legal documents to the best of their ability. Appellee's, Plaintiff's behavior is the main reason why Appellant has no money for an attorney in this case. This is more evidence of unclean hands.

Appellant disagreed with and has proven that the Findings of Fact are incorrect. It is absolutely impossible for the Court to state that the judgment which is a take down order is a "list of defamatory statements." Appellant didn't write the statements in the judgment!

Most were written and shared by Plaintiff, Plaintiff's veterinarian, government agencies and others.

The actual Texas judgment does not support a finding of "willful and malicious" behavior by Appellant. It is therefore dischargeable.

Konstantin Khionidi does not exist therefore Khionidi has no standing in this case. A case must be filed by a real person. This was argued in the Adversary Proceeding

# **REPLY TO APPELLEE'S ARGUMENT**

# I. Appellant's Reply to "Appeal Should be Dismissed"

Appellant is relying on the written record in this appeal and the transcript of one hearing.

Appellant included an Appendix and served the Appendix upon the Appellee.

Appellant is an indigent pro se party writing these documents to the best of Appellant's ability.

The reason Appellant cannot afford an attorney is the direct result of Appellee, Plaintiff's behavior. Appellant included volumes of defamatory and malicious behavior perpetrated by Appellee, Plaintiff. Appellee included further evidence of their malicious behavior in their reply to Appellant's Motion for Extension to file the OB. Appellee admitted they illegally obtained DMV documents by falsifying and forging documents. Appellee also admitted to paying "someone" to follow and film Appellant outside of someone else's home where Appellant was staying. This was not necessary as Appellant is the one who stated Appellant was staying at that address. On top of this the address which Appellee listed in filings was under a protective order. Appellee didn't even redact the VIN or license plate number from the publicly filed DMV records which is a violation of the redaction rule. Appellee clearly has unclean hands.

# II. Appellant's Reply to "Bankruptcy Court Judgment is Correct"

As previously argued the evidence does not indicate the debt from the judgment from the Texas courts meets the federal

standard of willful and malicious injury under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

A. Appellant's Reply to Texas Judgment Is Entitled To Full Faith

And Credit

In Texas law, there are three elements to collateral estoppel. The first is "the facts sought to be litigated in the second action were fully and fairly litigated in the first action."

The claims were not fully litigated in the Texas court.

One, Plaintiff never even stated what they felt was defamatory before or during the trial. Plaintiff never even stated whom they thought made any statements which they never mentioned. Plaintiff did not prove one element of defamation.

Two, there was no separate hearing for damages.

Damages were never litigated. As Plaintiff stated Plaintiff had no evidence of any damages or evidence of any causation, there can be no damages.

B. Appellant replies to "Facts were fully litigated"

The facts were not fully litigated. See A above. Plaintiff never even stated what they felt was defamatory.

#### 1. Elements of Defamation

Plaintiff did not even show one element of defamation in the trial court. Plaintiff never even stated what they felt was defamatory or who made what statement.

### 2. Facts Relevant to Dischargeability

A non dischargeable claim would have to prove that an act was (1) willful and (2) with malice. In this case Plaintiff never even stated what they felt was defamatory. There was no act. In order for an act to be willful, the act must exist and be real.

### C. Facts and the Texas Judgment

The Judgment doesn't state that Appellant made defamatory statements. The judgment is a take down order. Appellant didn't make or post most of the items in the take down order. Most were made by Plaintiff, government agencies... It's impossible for the acts of Plaintiff to be Appellant's defamation. Plaintiff merely wanted the items removed as they embarrassed Plaintiff and showed that Plaintiff is not a bat expert.

Appellee states "Without a finding that Cummins

published defamatory statements to third parties, there could obviously be no liability for defamation." Exactly! There was no finding that Appellant Cummins published defamatory statements so there is no liability for defamation.

The items in the take down order were never shown to be false. Under oath on the stand Plaintiff admitted that was Plaintiff's non-copyrighted manual was written by Plaintiff.

### D. Judgment Debtor

Many other people including Plaintiff wrote and shared items in the take down order. Appellant was the only Defendant in the case even though others wrote and shared items in the take down order. The items were clearly not litigated as the people who wrote them were never even listed as defendants or involved in the litigation.

The purpose of these frivolous Texas defamation cases was to stifle freedom of speech against many people with one lawsuit against one indigent out of state defendant. That's why Texas passed the Texas Citizen Participation and Defamation Mitigation Acts after this case was filed. Those Acts were a

direct response to identical frivolous defamation litigation such as this case.

### E. Sister-state Judgment

Again, the case was never fully litigated as damages were never litigated. There was no damages hearing or trial.

The Sister-statement judgment is ONLY the signed and filed 2012 judgment which is the subject of this bankruptcy case. Nothing else was attached to it. The judgment clearly states nothing else is included in the judgment.

### F. Texas Judgment is dischargeable

Again, the judgment does not show any willful or malicious act.

### 1. There was no defamation willful or otherwise

No element of defamation was shown in the trial court.

No evidence of willful or malicious was shown in the trial court. There is no mention of "defamation" or "willful or malicious" in the judgment.

# 2. There was no injury and no malicious injury

In order for an injury to be malicious there must first be an injury. Per Plaintiff's own statement on the stand in the trial Plaintiff admitted there was no evidence of any damages i.e. injury and no evidence of any causation by Defendant.

# III. Appellant's Reply to "Unclean Hands not Erroneous"

Appellant reiterates Appellant's previous allegations of "unclean hands." There is more evidence of unclean hands in Appellee's reply to Appellant's Motion for Extension (Doc #29 August 7, 2020). Not only did Appellee commit the crimes of forgery and fraud in order to illegally obtain DMV information, Appellee also perjured themselves many times in their filings.

# IV. Appellant's Reply to "No Issues of Fact Remain Regarding Validity of Assignment"

There are issues of fact remaining regarding the validity of the assignment and the existence of the Appellee. Appellee Konstantin Khionidi does not exist. There need to be at least two parties to an agreement. In this case there is only Plaintiff Amanda Lollar. Lollar admitted in person that the Russian straw person does not exist. A real person must file a complaint unless they use an anonymous name approved by the court such as John Doe. Khionidi is not a real person. For this reason the

Adversary Proceeding and the reply to this Appeal must be dismissed.

"An assignee of a judgment is not entitled to enforce the judgment under this title unless an acknowledgment of assignment of judgment to that assignee has been filed under Section 673 or the assignee has otherwise become an assignee of record."

The assignee must also exist. Plaintiff Lollar stated the assignee is a real live person living in Russia named Konstantin Khionidi. This person does not exist. Appellee's attorney Stillman swore that Khionidi would give the Judgment back to Plaintiff Lollar in Court. Stillman asked for time to get a notarized signature of Khionidi. The Court gave Stillman months and still Stillman was not able to get Khionidi to notarize a document a certified US California notary. Stillman told the Court Khionidi was on vacation for months and months and couldn't find a notary.

As it was the alleged trust agreement was just a free

California probate agreement found online. Appellee has lawyers

yet decides to download a free California probate agreement?

Appellee, Khionidi, whoever, stated they lived in California in Russia. There is no California in Russia. The trust agreement is void. The assignment is unenforceable. The Adversary Proceeding and reply to this Appeal must be dismissed as Khionidi does not exist.

Per CCP § 673 the assignment must include the address of the assignee and debtor. There was no real address for the assignee. The address for the debtor was intentionally incorrect. There was no real assignment.

The assignment stated that Debtor was mailed a copy of the assignment. This was false. The address on the assignment was intentionally false so debtor would never get a copy and never know about the assignment. The purpose was so Appellant would never realize that new litigation had started. This was done so that Plaintiff Lollar could try to get Appellant thrown in jail when Appellant missed a debtor hearing. Appellant did not know there was a debtor hearing because notice was never served or made. Appellant showed proof of this to the Court. This is more evidence of unclean hands.

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### APPELLANT'S REPLY TO APPELLEE'S REPLY BRIEF

1. The judgment is dischargeable.

The judgment doesn't include "defamation" or "malice." "The judgment must contain the names of the parties, the court, the final date of oral argument, the facts, and the reasons for decision." The judgment doesn't contain these things.

"After a court of competent jurisdiction enters a final judgment, it is a final adjudication and the doctrine of res judicata applies. If the debtor files bankruptcy, the Bankruptcy Court will not look beyond the judgment when it decides whether or not the judgment should be discharged. The Bankruptcy Court will not let you reargue the case in an adversary proceeding after a final judgment is entered. The Bankruptcy Court is compelled to give the debtor a fresh start and will discharge a judgment whenever possible."

In this case the Court should have only looked at the six page judgment. That judgment is the basis of this bankruptcy. The judgment as written is dischargeable.

There are issues which have not been litigated. One, Appellant was never allowed to litigate the issues in the earlier case.

Appellant was never able to litigate defamation as Plaintiff never stated what they felt was defamatory. Two, Appellant was never able to argue damages as there was no damages trial or hearing. "In order for collateral estoppel to apply, the party against whom it is sought to be employed must have had a fair and full opportunity to litigate the issue in the earlier case."

Because no element of defamation was ever mentioned or shown, defamation was not litigated. Because defamation was not litigated, it's impossible for malice to be litigated. "In Princess House Inc. v. Kraft (In re Kraft),20 the court ruled that the doctrine of collateral estoppel was inapplicable because the prior litigation did not determine whether the debtor had acted maliciously. The court held that collateral estoppel was inapplicable because the issue of malice, as employed in Bankruptcy Code §523(a)(6), was never before the jury.

Consequently, the issue of malice was never actually litigated, and collateral estoppel could not be applied to the prior judgment."

Plaintiff would have had to have shown that Defendant's acts caused Plaintiff's damages. Plaintiff admitted Plaintiff had no

evidence of damages or causation by Defendant under oath in court. Section 523(a)(2)(A), the creditor must show that the debtor's fraud was a proximate cause of the damage to the creditor. Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. at 61, 64 (describing Section 523(a)(2)(A) as an exception to the discharge of debts "resulting from" or "traceable to" fraud). Plaintiff never showed this and admitted the opposite in court under oath.

In trial Defendant pro se asked Plaintiff Lollar if Lollar had any

proof of any damages or causation. Plaintiff replied "no." In trial Defendant examined Plaintiff Lollar over the issue of financial loss Doc #8 Exhibit 4 and causation, pg 206, line 3.

"Q. Again, my only question right now is: Do you have any proof that I am the cause of certain of your finances being down? I mean, overall your finances are way up, they are almost double.

A.They're -- They're -- I don't have any proof that it was you."

Plaintiff Lollar in the trial court never stated any financial damages or otherwise. Plaintiff refused to provide any bills, receipts, medical records, financial records of any type to show any damages. Plaintiff also admitted Plaintiff had no proof of any causation by Defendant.

### 2. Appellee has no standing

Appellee does not exist. One, this makes the assignment void.

Two, a person who does not exist cannot file a lawsuit unless under a court approved name. This was not done. Konstantin Khionidi cannot file the Adverse Proceeding or reply to Appellant's Opening Brief. Appellee had three years to prove they existed.

Appellee's attorney Philip Stillman swore to the court that Appellee would sign and notarize a document but failed to ever notarize a document.

### 3. Appellee has unclean hands.

This has been shown in multiple court filings in the sister-state case, Adverse Proceeding, the Appeals case, underlying Texas case and even outside of the court.

### **CONCLUSION**

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion to dismiss the Adversary Proceeding because the judgment is dischargeable, Plaintiff has no standing and Plaintiff has unclean hands should have been granted.

The Court is asked to reverse the order, dismiss the Adversary

Proceeding and find that the judgment is dischargeable. Appellant also

requests an award of fees and costs for this appeal and the other court proceedings in amounts to be determined.

Respectfully submitted,

Mary Cummins

Appellant In Pro Per

# **CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE**

# Pursuant to California Rule of Court 8.204(c)(1)

Pursuant to California Rule of Court 8.204(c)(1), I certify that the text of this brief is less than the maximum per mandate. In so certifying, I am relying on the word count of Microsoft Word 2003, the computer program used to prepare this brief.

DATED: October 28, 2020 Respectfully submitted,

Ву \_\_\_\_\_

Mary Cummins

Appellant in Pro Per

# PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL (FRCivP 5 (b)) or (CCP 1013a, 2015.5) or (FRAP 25 (d))

I am Plaintiff in pro per whose address is 645 W. 9th St. #110-140, Los Angeles, California 90015-1640. I am over the age of eighteen years. I further declare that on the date hereof I served a copy of:

### APPELLANT'S REPLY TO APPELLEE'S REPLY

on the following parties by filing it with the ECF system.

Philip Stillman Stillman & Associates

Judge Robert Kwan US Bankruptcy Court

I declare under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the State of California, that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this day, October 28, 2020, at Los Angeles, California.

Respectfully submitted,

Mary Cummins

645 W. 9th St. #110-140

Los Angeles, CA 90015